This paper develops a model to answer the question whether a bank should hold a share of the equity of a borrowing firm. The model shows that a small equity stake held by the bank can have a significant and positive impact on the lending relationship. The benefit of bank equity participation arises from the reduced ability of the bank to extract rents from the firm in multiple rounds of financing. This, in turn, improves the firm's incentive to make investments in profitable projects that require future outside finance. This benefit is likely to be significant for small to medium firms, growth firms, and firms with ongoing capital needs. The paper addresses, from a corporate finance perspective, the current debate about whether banks sho uld be allowed to own equity stakes and how large these should be.
Introduction
This paper analyzes the impact of the nature of financial contracts on the efficiency and value of firm-bank relationships. It shows that equity participation by banks can help overcome a welldocumented agency problem, namely the ability of banks to extract rents from their captive borrowers. Reducing this problem creates value for firms, their banks, and the economy as a whole by improving the firms' investment incentives. The paper takes a corporate finance perspective on the topical question of bank regulation of equity ownership. For the US banking system, the paper argues for changes to current regulations that severely restrict commercial bank equity ownership. 1 For many other economies, where bank equity participation is allowed, the paper provides a theoretical model to analyze the optimal amount of equity that banks should hold in their borrowing firms.
2 While the benefits of bank equity participation can be large, generally only small minority equity stakes are necessary, and the firms that benefit the most are small to medium size growth firms, which are responsible for almost half of the GNP of the US (Petersen and Rajan (1994) ). Bank finance is by far the most significant source of finance for these firms (Berger and Udell (1998) ).
The basic problem underlying the model is as follows: when a firm raises funds from a bank, the bank can later extract profits when the firm needs further financing. This profit extraction, a type of hold-up problem, is possible because during its lending relationship the bank acquires privileged information about firm quality. As a consequence, the firm cannot approach any other, uninformed potential providers for follow-on financing, because these alternative investors would assume (rationally) that the firm is of poor quality -otherwise the firm would surely have been able to obtain continued financing from its informed bank. This monopoly power allows the firm's bank to extract rents at the re-financing stage. The main concern with this bank hold-up problem is that the expectation of profit extraction by the bank reduces the incentives of the firm to create profits in the first place. In other words, the bank relationship is costly because it leads to less efficient investment behavior by the firm. The resulting distortion of firm investments is a true social cost and will lead to lower firm values. This problem with bank lending was first discussed in Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) , and later substantiated in a long line of empirical papers.
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The main point of this paper is to show that the negative effect of bank profit extraction can be significantly reduced when the bank holds a mix of debt and equity as opposed to pure debt. In essence, the bank becomes a co-investor in the firm and can no longer credibly threaten to withhold funds for future follow-on capital expenditures. This reduction in bank bargaining power improves the firm's expected future terms of credit, which in turn provides the firm with incentives to develop the growth projects in the first place. As a result, the firm will be more valuable, the bank will earn a fair return, and overall welfare will be improved due to better firm decision making and more efficient investments. A small minority equity stake suffices, 4 because the very source of the hold-up problem -the bank's private information -makes the bank's bargaining power extremely sensitive to the terms of the contracts. We are also able to show that junior debt held by the bank is not a substitute for equity. Furthermore, since the bank's bargaining power is important, it is equally ineffective to have the equity held by third parties instead of the bank.
A practical example helps clarify the intuition. Imagine a small manufacturing firm that obtains bank financing. Initially, there are many competing banks willing to provide credit at fair rates. With the loan, the small firm develops it manufacturing capabilities. In the process, it has many interactions with its bank, such as loan payments, working capital transactions, payroll services, etc. The bank thus learns about firm and management quality. Over time, if the firm and its management "do the right thing" (exert effort, invest in future growth, contain costs, limit their own salaries and perquisites), the firm will create growth opportunities that require further capital. At that point, the bank can ask for significantly above market interest rates and credit terms. This is because the firm cannot approach other lenders. If it did, then these other -less informed -lenders would have to conclude that the original inside bank's refusal to provide further funding is an indication of low firm/management quality. Anticipating that its bank will extract profits of future projects, the small manufacturer may choose all along not to engage in a value maximizing strategy. It may choose to forgo firm specific investments in research and client development and instead consume perquisites and self-deal firm assets. Now, if the bank had taken an equity position in the small manufacturer, then the bank would not be in a position to credibly threaten to withhold funding in the future. This is because the bank would partially suffer the adverse consequences -outside finance at terrible rates -that would result from withholding fairly priced, informed finance. This reduction in bank bargaining power wo uld improve firm investment and management behavior, and increase both firm value and social welfare.
In more general terms, we can derive a series of empirical predictions from the model. First, the extraction of profits by the bank happens only when new financing is needed. Thus, the conclusions of the paper best apply to firms with growth opportunities and the accompanying financing needs. Furthermore, the benefits of a bank's equity participation are highest when it is difficult or costly for a firm to access multiple or non-bank sources of funds. This constraint applies mostly to young or small firms. 5 Finally, the results apply to firms where outside investors have trouble judging firm quality. This occurs in economies where public financial markets are not well developed or information about public and/or private firms is opaque. Similarly, banks are likely to have significant power versus their borrowers in economies where the banking sector is not very competitive, as is the case for instance in the UK (Cruickshank (2000) ). This paper thus allows researchers to incorporate the effects of bank equity participation, both within and across countries, into studies of firm value and investment efficiency.
The model can also be applied by banks that want to establish the optimal level of equity participation over the life-cycle of their borrowing firms. In particular, equity participation is more important when (i) the firm is likely to have future financing needs that exceed its internal cash flow,
(ii) the bank has significant amounts of private information, and (iii) the bank has a strong bargaining position versus the firm. As these variables change over the life of a firm, so does the value-maximizing equity stake implied by the model. This paper assumes that firms must rely on bank financing rather than other, nonintermediated alternatives. This describes the vast majority of small to medium real world firms in most economies (and even large firms in many economies like Germany and Japan). For many reasons (see the literature review below), bank debt is an efficient financing vehicle. Even in the US, bank debt exceeds venture and angel capital by a factor of 3 for all non-farm, non-financial, non-real estate businesses with less than 500 employees (Berger and Udell (1998) ). This is likely to be even more true in other economies with less developed venture capital markets. Thus, a refinement of firm-bank relationships to include bank equity participation is clearly a useful improvement of existing capital allocation mechanisms.
The paper proceeds as follows: the next sub-section provides a short account of some of the most related theoretical papers. Section 2 develops the model. Section 3 analyzes the model and derives the main results. Section 4 evalua tes both the assumptions and the predictions of the model in light of the available empirical research and suggests additional empirical strategies. Section 5 6 concludes and suggests extensions.
Related Literature
Many theories analyze the benefits of having financing provided by banks rather than other agents or markets. They include papers by Diamond (1984 Diamond ( , 1991 , Mayer (1988) , Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992) and von Thadden (1995) . However, there are relatively few papers that explicitly analyze the terms of the contracts that should optimally be signed between a firm and a bank. 6 While Diamond (1984) shows that a standard debt contract is optimal in his model, the focus is on the feasibility and efficiency of delegated monitoring, and his static model cannot address the dynamic issues outlined in this paper. Other papers examine whether bank debt should be senior or junior (Diamond (1993) , Welch (1997) and others), but they do not consider the issue of bank equity stakes.
Recent papers that do address the contractual form between banks and firms examine issues different from those discussed in this paper. Berlin, John, and Saunders (1996) examine the qualitysignaling effect of having an informed bank choose particular equity positions in its borrowers. This signaling leads to efficient re-negotiations with uninformed third parties (such as suppliers or employees) during financial distress, and it is thus unrelated to the issues of hold-up in this paper.
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However, Berlin, et al. do point out that "the [...] relationship between the debt-equity structure of the bank's claim and its power to influence firm behavior is an important topic for research." Boyd, Chang, and Smith (1998) examine the effect that equity participation has on project choice. In their model the bank will, by virtue of holding equity, share in some of the noncontractible perquisites which the firm can withhold from other investors, and the firm's project choice is then influenced by the bank's strategy. Their model is set in a costly state verification framework, and banks will be either lenders or owners, but not both at the same time (the central feature of this paper). The issues addressed in Boyd et al. are deposit insurance and general equilibrium considerations. Tröge (1997) examines the impact of equity participation on the interaction of several banks in the credit market process. Analyzing multi-party auctions for new credit business, the bank with the largest equity stake is more likely to win. This, in turn, causes the bank(s) with smaller stakes to limit their competition for loans. The issues examined are the nature of informed bank competition in credit auctions, not the ongoing financing of growing firms examined in the this paper.
In other papers related to this one, Sharpe (1990) , Rajan (1992), and von Thadden (1998) consider banks with private information about their borrowers, and the banks use the information to extract profits. However, Sharpe and Rajan take the form of the contracts as given (they assume debt). While von Thadden does consider the optimal type of contract, his model is set in a complete contracting world, which leads to very different results from the current setup. Equity participation is not an issue in von Thadden's paper, and the hold-up problem can be "contracted away". John, John, and Saunders (1994) , Santos (1999) , and Lepetit (2003) examine the effect of equity ownership on the riskiness of a bank's (often government insured) portfolio. They show that, while the insured bank may be inclined to increase portfolio risk, the borrowing firm will choose less risky projects when the bank holds some equity. A bank's overall portfolio risk may thus be lower when it holds some equity claims. The focus of these papers is on bank portfolio risk. They do, however, highlight that there is no a priori reason for limiting bank equity ownership.
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The empirical literature is discussed in section 4 below. 8 The prudential regulation of a bank's ability to hold equity from a non-corporate finance perspective is also discussed in , Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) , Hellwig (1991) and Roe (1990) . A historical perspective on changes in the US system is given in Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995) .
The Model
There are three dates, t ∈ {0,1,2}. Everyone is risk-neutral.
At t = 0 a firm requires funds for an initial investment i > 0. The funds are raised from one of many competitive banks. 9 Also at this time, the firm's manager chooses to exert effort 0 ≤ e ≤ 1 at a private, monetary equivalent convex utility cost of ½ke 2 . The effort choice cannot be observed.
Effort is a metaphor for any moral hazard problem that affects the long-term profitability of the firm. It is a euphemism for any firm-specific investments. If corporate restructuring and largescale layoffs, investment in customer relationships, implementation of an alternative strategy, or refraining from perquisite consumption are less desirable to the manager than other alternatives, then the current set-up captures the effects of managerial self-interest. In other words, "high effort" is generically equivalent to "doing the right thing to maximize firm value".
At t = 1 a new project becomes available, which has either high (h) or low (l) quality.
Managerial effort at t = 0 determines the probability p(e) of having a high quality project available at t = 1. In fact, we assume that p(e) = e. Which type of project is available is public information at t = 1. 10 Also at t = 1, both the firm and the inside bank receive a signal about the expected profitability of the project. The signal is not observed by the outside financial market, and it is good with probability θ or bad with probability (1 -θ). Rajan ('92) discusses at length why the inside bank, in the course of its lending relationship, acquires information about the firm that is not available to outside financial markets. The new project requires an additional investment of I. 11 This capital can 9 The benefits of borrowing from a bank are discussed elsewhere and include monitoring, lowering costs of financial distress, and the ability to engage in long-term relationship specific contracts. The assumption of one bank is made for convenience and realism (Petersen and Rajan (1994) show that most small and medium firms have a small number of banks -usually one). The model can be extended to the case where the firm has multiple banks, but borrows a large proportion of its funds from one bank. Making the banking sector competitive is done for convenience, so that we do not have to worry about the distribution of the total ex-ante available surplus. Changing it would not affect the analysis. 10 A high quality project may be the entry into a new market after successful product innovation. A low quality project may follow unsuccessful innovation efforts and simply involve low-margin exploitation of existing markets. 11 Making I and θ independent of project quality is not crucial, but it simplifies the exposition.
be raised from the existing (inside) bank or from the competitive outside financial market.
At t = 2 the firm realizes its payoffs. High and low quality projects j ∈ {h,l} pay either C + X (success) or C (failure). The probability of success is Π j -Q j Π j (if a bad signal was received) or Π j + Q j (1-Π j ) (if a good signal was received), where 0 < Q j < 1 is the informativeness of the signal: Q j = 0 is uninformative (the success probability is Π j , regardless of the signal), while Q j = 1 is perfectly informative (the success probability is 1 following a good signal and 0 following a bad signal). For future reference, we define the ex ante expected probability of success as (1-P h )
(1-P l )
Lastly, denote as ( )
the relative informativeness of the signal, which measures the increase in the probability of a high cash flow when a good signal is observed, relative to the probability of a high cash flow when a bad signal is observed. Also, a few assumptions are needed for tractability:
A1 : P h > P l (this merely defines 'high quality')
capital cannot be raised risk free, projects always have positive NPV, and the fist best solution is feasible. C > i is for convenience only and avoids having to examine sub-cases.
A3
: Bargaining between the firm and its inside bank over follow-on financing proceeds as follows: with probability 0 < α < 1 the bank makes a take-it or leave-it offer, and with probability (1 -α) the firm makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. If an offer is rejected, the n the firm approaches the uninformed, competitive outside financial markets for funding.
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A4 : The firm can raise the initial i at t = 0 by issuing debt (junior or senior) as well as equity. I (the funds required at t = 1) cannot be raised at t = 0, because the nature of the future projects is unknown and non-contractible at t = 0.
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Assumption A4 may raise some concern: it assumes that firms and banks are limited to junior and senior debt as well as bank and third party equity. This is not a severe problem, because the main message of the paper is to show that allowing banks to take equity stakes is beneficial relative to 12 Nash or Rubinstein bargaining lead to the same results, but require more assumptions about the timing and structure of the game. Intuitively, all that is required is that the bank on average captures a fraction α of any bargaining surplus. 13 See Hart ('95) for a lucid discussion of the non-contractibility assumption. Clearly, the fact that not all future contingencies can be specified in a contract is the reason that firms are run by managers and not automatons.
limiting them to debt contracts. To develop a framework where debt and equity are uniquely optimal, while allowing all parties to optimize over all general financial contracts would, in this dynamic context, necessitate a significantly more complicated set-up. The fact that the most commonly observed contracts are indeed debt and equity provides additional justification for focusing on these.
Ruling out the possibility of the firm obtaining unlimited funds at t = 0 (either as cash or via an unconditional, irrevocable and guaranteed line of credit) for currently unknown, future investments, is consistent with almost all real world situations. Nevertheless, this issue could also be addressed explicitly by extending the model. The introduction of a risky negative NPV project at t = 1, which the firm might nevertheless take on due to its limited liability, would lead to the result that giving the firm at t = 0 all funds it could ever conceivably need is inefficient.
Analysis of Contracts
This section derives the results of the model. The specific testable restrictions arising from the model are described and compared to the existing empirical literature in section 4.
We examine the effect of different contracts on firm value net of effort cost. This is the appropriate metric, because the firm is either owned by an entrepreneur/manager who takes effort cost into consideration, or the firm's owners will have to compensate the manager for effo rt cost in the incentive contract. To avoid modeling the incentive contracts 14 between the manager and hypothetical non-management owners, we assume that the firm is owned by the manager. Because the financial sector has no productive role, 15 maximizing firm value net of effort costs coincides with maximizing social surplus and any welfare analysis coincides with the analysis of firm value.
14 As long as a manager would have to be paid any strictly positive incentive fee by non-management owners for the high effort choice, the current model retains its features and results even with non-management owners. 15 In equilibrium, all positive net present value projects get financed by assumption A2.
The following lemma captures the adverse selection problem (lemons problem) arising from the fact that the inside bank has an informational advantage relative to the outside financial markets.
Lemma 1:
If the firm approaches the outside financial market for funds at t = 1, then the market will rationally infer that the firm and its bank received a bad signal about profitability.
Proof: See appendix 1.
Lemma 1 formalizes the source of the bargaining power for the inside bank. Since the outside financial market will infer that only bad firms ask for funding (good firms continue to obtain funding from their informed banks), the terms of finance will be bad.
First Best
We begin by establishing the first best outcome as a benchmark. It is found by assuming that managerial effort is contractible and information is symmetric so that finance can be raised at fair value from the competitive financial markets.
Lemma 2:
The first best solution is found by maximizing firm value net of effort cost given by
The solution is
and e FB is between 0 and 1.
Proof: (3) follows from the set-up of the model and the competitive financial markets assumption.
(4) follows from solving (3) and it is between 0 and 1 by assumption A2.
Debt only
This section examines the current model under the restrictions imposed by both the current state of research (Rajan (1992) and others) as well as the existing regulations in the U.S. and some other countries, where bank equity holdings are severely restricted.
An outline of the solution provides useful intuition. Superscripts D denote the debt-only case.
At t = 0, the firm maximizes expected firm value net of effort cost:
Note that, by including the manager's effort costs, we have incorporated the manager's incentive compatibility constraint directly in the maximization. and 
where e D is the expected equilibrium leve l of effort chosen by the firm. We obtain the following: 
The proposition shows that managerial effort will, in general, deviate from the first best e FB =
(1/k)X(P h -P l ). This implies that firm value will be lower than first best. Equation (9) has an intuitive interpretation for the three terms in curly brackets. The term in the first curly brackets is the standard moral hazard term, which would be present if there was no asymmetric information problem. Similar to Innes (1990) , if there is no asymmetric information, standard debt can implement first best. The second and third curly brackets are present because of the bank hold-up problem and are responsible for any deviations from first best. The second curly brackets contain the amount of risky funding that the firm needs (I + i is needed, and C will be received for sure). This is a source of market power for the bank, because risky finance is difficult to obtain from uninformed outside financial markets. The third curly brackets contain the effect that the bank's information has on managerial effort. It depends on the bank's bargaining power α, and the information structure: the probability that the bank has a valuable signal, θ, and the relative strength of this signal for either quality project, β j .
While the main results of the paper follow in later sections, a first result follows immediately: Proof: Immediate from equation (9) and the definition of first best in equation (4).
The case where β h > β l , which is the case assumed in the previous literature (see e.g. Rajan (1992) ), can be interpreted as the bank having private information about the profitability of good future investment projects, and the manager's efforts produce these future projects. While there might be cases where the parameters satisfy β h < β l (this would be interpreted as the bank having private information only about assets in place, which can be used or sold when the firm does poorly), this seems less likely. That is because the simple classification into two cases, β h > β l and β h < β l , results from assuming that future investment needs (I) and the likelihood of receiving a good signal (θ) are the same for high and low quality projects. If I or θ are greater for the high quality project (say because it represents likely successful expansion into a new product or market), then this is equivalent to β h > β l . 17 Overall, this seems the most likely scenario for most firms, especially growing ones. Therefore, in what follows, we will assume -as the previous literature does -that:
17 Making I and θ explicitly project quality dependent would, however, significantly increase the algebraic complexity of presenting the solution, without adding any additional insights.
Assump tion A4 implies that the anticipation of the bank hold-up problem at t = 1 leads the manager to under-invest in effort at t = 0. This is because the firm rationally anticipates that the bank can extract more rents from the firm if the firm invests in effort at t = 0.
Debt and Bank Equity
In this section we examine the impact of equity ownership by the bank. We will show that bank equity participation reduces the hold-up problem and consequently improves firm investment incentives and increases firm va lue. The subsequent sections will show that equity ownership by uninformed third parties and junior bank debt are not good substitutes for bank equity participation.
A restriction on how much equity we consider is helpful for tractability: because this paper is concerned with 'small' equity ownership positions by banks (rather than large, controlling stakes which likely have economic consequences beyond the current model), we limit the analysis as follows:
A5 : the bank's equity stake γ is limited to (i) γ < α, and (ii) γ < (
Neither restriction is necessary, but they eliminate the need to talk about various sub-cases and degenerate solutions. Intuitively, if the equity component in financing γ at t = 0 is very large, the second period project can be financed with risk-free debt. While this obviously makes the information problem uninteresting, it is also unrealistic for most firms. 
This compares to the debt-only case, where
As equation (12) shows, the bank's outside option to refuse financing is now sensitive to the potential cost of uninformed outside finance,
In other words, because the bank is a co-investor in the firm, it does not want the firm to have to go to the uninformed outside financial markets to borrow at high rates The face value of the debt, d E , is again determined by the bank's initial break-even condition:
( )
where e E is the expected equilibrium leve l of effort chosen by the firm. We obtain the following: 
2) If the model hazard problem is not too severe relative to the information problem (X(P h -P l ) is not too large), then bank equity participation (γ > 0) increases firm value.
This proposition shows that the deviation from first best is quite different in the bank equity case than in the debt only case. Equation (14) has an intuitive interpretation for the three terms in curly brackets. The first curly brackets contain the term we would get in a standard moral hazard set up -if the bank were to hold equity γ. The term was equal to {(P h -P l )X} in the debt case. As is well known (Innes (1992) ), a positive equity stake (held by the bank or others) reduces effort in a moral hazard model. The second and third curly bracket terms contain the effects of the adverse selection problem.
The second curly brackets contain the amount of external funding that the firm will have to obtain at t = 1. This term is now lower than in the debt only case, where it was (I + i -C). This is because the bank now expects some participation in the upside of the firm, and thus requires a lower initial amount of debt face value -which frees up second period risk free debt capacity. This reduces the bank's ability to extract rents when the firm needs new money (if the firm has unused risk-free debt capacity, then the bank's information advantage is not as valuable). While this term represents clearly an advantage of having the bank hold equity, we will see below that this can also be achieved by having uninformed third parties hold the equity. Hence, this is not the term that is responsible for the claim in this paper, namely that bank equity ownership is important.
The third curly brackets contain the effect that the bank's information has on managerial effort. The bank's equity stake γ in this term is directly responsible for lowering the hold-up problem and its consequences. The term depends on the bank's bargaining power α, the information structure θ and β j , and the equity stake. We can compare this factor in the debt-only case and the debt plus equity case: 
Looking at (15), we can state the following result for this factor: one of the effects of bank equity participation is to reduce the bank's bargaining power. Wherever α appeared in the debt-only case, it now appears as ( α -γ). Intuitively, the equity does not actually reduce the bank's bargaining power directly. It does, however, make the outside option for the bank (to refuse follow-on financing) less attractive, as the bank would now bear part of the resulting cost via its equity stake.
In the current set-up, as in other bargaining structures, worse outside options are similar to having less bargaining power. In this model, it maps algebraically directly into bargaining power, which goes from α to (α -γ).
The privileged information that the bank has about the firm's prospects plays a crucial role.
Not only is this information the source of market power for the bank during future rounds of financing, but it also makes the bank's ability to extract rents very sensitive to the nature of the bank's claim. In particular, a bank is very strong in any bargaining over future funding, whenever it holds a claim to the lower tail of the cash flow distribution (i.e. debt). This is because the bank can be sure to receive a reasonable payoff even if bargaining were to fail. Shifting the bank's claim towards the upper tail of the cash flow distribution (i.e. holding some equity) significantly improves the firm's bargaining position. This is true even for small equity stakes, because the improvement is more dramatic the larger the amount of privileged information that the bank has about the firm.
Intuitively, this works as follows: if the bank has a 'lot' of private information that the rest of the financial market does not have, then the potential outside, uninformed terms of credit would be 'very' bad. This is precisely the time when the bank would not want to own any equity stake in the firm, because this equity stake is directly and negatively affected by any losses due to unfavorable terms of credit. If the private signal that the bank has is not that 'informative', then the difference between 'fair' internal funds and 'unfavorable' external finance is small, and the bank's equity stake does not impose severe penalties on the bank in case it threatens to withhold funds. In this case the bank's outside option remains credible and relatively intact even with an equity stake. Boot and Thakor (1993) formally analyze the differential sensitivities of debt and equity to private information, albeit in a different context. Figure 2 illustrates the effect of bank equity ownership on firm value for a parameterized example. Because of the non-productive, competitive financial sector, firm value coincides with social welfare. The parameter values are listed in appendix 2. The example shows that firm value can easily be increased 10% by allowing the firm-bank relationship to be more efficient. Note that the equity stake required is very small (less than 10%). The comparative statics of the benefits of bank equity ownership are straight forward. Because the benefits of bank equity participation are driven by the need to blunt the bank's information driven market power, they only materialize if (i) the bank has bargaining power (α > 0), (ii) the bank has private information (θ > 0), and (iii) the firm needs risky outside finance (I + i > C). Hence, the results of the paper best apply to capital-needing growth firms in environments with strong banks that have close long-term relationships with firms, as well as economies with poor outside availability of information about firms. The following corollary summarizes the discussion.
Corollary 2: Bank equity participation can only have a positive effect on firm value if (i) banks have positive bargaining power (α > 0) (ii) banks have private information (θ > 0) (iii) firms need more funds at t = 1 than they generate internally (I + i > C)
Proof: See appendix 1. One important conclusion from the above corollary is that the importance of bank equity participation changes over the life-cycle of the firm. When the firm is young, the bank is likely to be strong and has information that other potential investors do not have. Also, the firm is likely to need external follow-on financing. However, as the firm matures, there will be more information available to all investors, and the firm's internal cash flows will contribute more and more to its capital needs.
Hence, the importance of bank equity participation declines.
Bank Equity versus Uninformed Outside Equity
This section shows that the benefits of bank equity cannot be obtained by having the equity held by uninformed outside investors. 18 The derivation of the solution is analogous to the above two cases of debt-only and bank equity. The superscript OE refers to outside equity. Proof: See appendix 1.
The interpretation of the result is as follows: on the negative side, outside uninformed equity has the same direct detrimental effect on the managerial moral hazard component as bank equity did -this is evident from the term in the first curly brackets in equation (16). On the positive side, uninformed outside equity has one benefit that bank equity also has: any equity increases the firm's second period risk-free debt capacity, which shows up in the second curly bracket term of equation (16). Compared to the debt-only case, bank equity reduced this term from {I + i -C} to {I + i -C -γ(eP h + (1 -e)P l )X}. Outside equity achieves exactly the same reduction. This alleviates the hold-up problem, because the firm does not have to rely as much on the informed lender.
However, the part of the hold-up problem that cannot be addressed with outside equity (but it can be addressed when the bank holds the equity) is the explicit ability of the bank to threaten to withhold funds. This credible threat depends crucially on the bank's cash flow claim -and hence its equity position. When the bank owns equity, it becomes a co-investor in the firm's future, and any threat to withhold funding is less credible (more painful for the bank). This is why, in the bank equity case, the bank's bargaining power appeared as (α -γ). However, in the third-party equity case, it continues to appear as α in the third curly brackets of equation (16). An additional comment is in order: the choice of financial instrument at t = 0 does not, in this paper, convey any new information to the market, because there is symmetric information among all parties at that stage.
19 A choice by the firm to use equity at t = 1 might convey information to the market.
However, it would not be in the interest of the firm to issue equity at that time, because t = 1 is the time with the highest amount of information asymmetry. This calls for debt rather than equity as an optimal instrument for exactly the same reasons as it did in Myers and Majluf (1984) . Because the current paper does not contribute new insights on this topic, and because there are no benefits from issuing equity at t = 1, we simply assume that the second period project will be financed with debt. 
Bank Equity versus Junior Debt
This section shows that the benefits of bank equity cannot be obtained by having the bank 19 Any additional asymmetric information effect would have the same effect as in Myers and Majluf (1984) . This would reduce the benefits of equity for the same reasons as in that paper. Note, however, that this logic would apply to any type of equity, not just bank equity. Hence, bank equity would still be relatively better than uninformed third party equity. 20 We can show that issuing equity to outside parties at t = 1 is bad, while issuing equity to the symmetrically informed bank is equivalent to issuing debt, because there are no actions after t = 1 that are affected by the nature of the contract.
hold junior debt instead. By junior debt we mean that the bank holds a fixed face value claim, but allows the firm to issue new debt at t = 1 that has a higher priority. While there are some obvious concerns about this situation, it is still worth investigating whether this dominates having the bank own an equity stake. In the real world, banks choose to hold no junior debt claims in almost all cases. As Longhofer and Santos (2000) point out and substantiate, "it has become a generally accepted fact that bank debt is typ ically senior to that of other creditors, particularly for small business borrowers." In addition, many theory papers 21 have pointed out that banks should not own junior debt. Hence, examining the robustness of the model to banks owning junior debt is probably more of a secondary consideration. In addition, adding any reason to the model for the bank not to want to allow the firm to issue new claims that are senior to the bank's claim (fear of expropriation, or fear that the limited liability firm might want to engage in asset substitution by issuing senior debt and taking on risky negative NPV projects at t = 1), would also rule out junior bank debt as optimal. Proof: See appendix 1.
The derivation and interpretation of the optimal effort level is the same as in the bank debt, bank equity and the outside equity cases. The reason that junior debt is not the same as bank equity is fairly straight forward: since junior debt still leaves the bank with a relatively more senior claim than the firm, it does little to alter the bargaining outcome between these two parties. Junior debt can only help by increasing the firm's second period low risk debt capacity. As such, its effect is very similar to uninformed outside equity. It alleviates one part of the problem (the funding shortfall), but does not address the other (the bank's strong bargaining position). Junior debt does, however, have a somewhat different direct effect on the moral hazard component of the model, making clear predictions somewhat complex. This is not further pursued here, as an extensive literature on this topic exists (Diamond (1993) , Welch (1997) , and Repullo and Suarez (1998) ).
The Model and the Evidence
This section examines the model in light of the empirical evidence. First, we examine whether the assumptions made in the model are supported by the empirical evidence. We find strong support for the existence of the financing issues that underlie the paper. Second, we examine the testable predictions the model generates. While some of these have already been tested in different contexts, we also suggest ways to develop new tests and interpretations of the results. In general, the existing empirical literature lends significant support to the policy recommendations of this paper ("allowing bank equity participation is efficiency enhancing" and "optimal bank equity participation changes over the life of a company"). We also show where further work can be done with existing datasets.
The model's assumptions and the evidence
The model assumes that firm-bank relationships are valuable. Flath (1993) , Kester (1991) , Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1990) and Prowse (1990) study Japanese firms and conclude that bank relationships improve investment and value. Harm (1996) and Allen and Gale (1995) provide similar evidence for Germany and Berger and Udell (1995) for the US The model further assumes that banks have privileged information about firms. Evidence along these lines is in Allen and Gale (1995) and Flath (1993) . Lastly, the model assumes that firms often rely on a small number of banks. Petersen and Rajan (1994) provide evidence for small and medium US firms, Smith (2000, 2001) and Farinha and Santos (2000) look at an international comparison -however, Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) have some evidence that Italy may be different. Ongena and Smith (1999) provide an overview over the empirical literature on firm-bank relationships.
The model's predictions and the evidence
The testable predictions fall into two broad catego ries: firm specific and economy wide effects.
A. Firm specific effects 1) Small bank equity stakes increase firm value, and the increase in value is larger for young growth firms, and firms with close banking relationships with a small number of banks.
2) The cost of capital for projects will be lower for firms where banks have taken equity stakes.
B. Economy wide effects 1) Bank equity stakes will have a greater impact on firm value in economies where financial information is difficult to get for outsiders and where the banking sector is non-competitive.
2) There will be relatively more funds provided by banks to growth firms (and relatively less by others like venture capitalists) in economies where bank equity ownership is allowed.
3) Multiple bank relationships and mechanisms that reduce bank bargaining power are substitutes for bank equity stakes.
We examine the existing evidence and suggest further tests. First, the firm specific effects:
1) Bank equity and value: Pushner (1995, Japan) and Gorton and Schmid (1999, Germany) find evidence consistent with the model. Gorton and Schmid find evidence only in the early part of their sample. Consistent with the predictions of this paper, they point out that the evidence is less impressive once the banking sector becomes more competitive and firms have access to more non-bank finance in the latter part of the sample. James (1995) finds that banks hold more substantial equity stakes in those firms that have growth opportunities and need more outside finance. Kim (1991) finds similar results in Japan. Bianco and Chiri (1997) find that those Italian firms that concentrate their credit relationships on one bank, generally have a larger incidence of having the bank be an owner as well. Also, Kim (1991) finds that Japanese bank equity holdings increase in the proportion of financing it provides to the firm. More work on European firm data would be needed to see if banks take equity stakes in young firms.
2) Bank equity stakes and cost of capital: using European data (e.g. Ongena and Smith 2001), one could examine the correlation between cost of capital and bank equity stakes.
Next, we look at economy-wide effects.
1) Bank equity effect on f irm value, considering financial information availability, and banking sector competitiveness: La Porta, et al. (1998) develop a measure of accounting standards in various countries that measures the availability of information to outside investors. This could be used to examine the predictions of the model. Also, there are measures for competitiveness of the banking sector that could be employed (e.g. Cruickshank (2000)).
2) More bank finance for growth firms if bank equity participation is allowed: this is consistent with the fact that in the US (where bank equity is prohibited), growth firms are financed to a larger extent than in other countries from non-bank sources. Even in the US, however, banks remain by far the largest provider of finance for small, growing firms (Berger and Udell (1998) ).
More formal tests based on the regulation data of Barth, et al. (1997) would be desirable.
3) Multiple bank relationships as substitutes for bank equity stakes: Detragiache, Garella, and Guiso (2000) have all the data necessary to test this prediction in Italy.
Conclusion and Extensions
This paper argues that equity ownership by banks alleviates a hold-up problem between firms and their banks. The banks' equity stakes improve access to finance for firms. The anticipation of this access provides the firm with the correct incentives to make firm-specific investments in growth and profitability. Overall, the efficiency gain from allowing banks to take equity positions leads to higher firm values and increased social welfare. The results apply most strongly to growing small and medium sized firms. Significant improvements in efficiency are achieved even for small, minority equity stakes. The paper speaks to regulators in countries like the US, where equity participation is severely restricted by law. In addition, the paper helps banks in other countries to determine the optimal level of equity participation over the life of the firm. Finally, the paper can help transition economies in designing optimal financial regulations.
A natural extension of the paper would be to examine more complicated contracts between banks and firms. This paper points to an important consideration in evaluating the efficiency of additional contractual features like embedded options and collateral restrictions: the nature of the bank's claim on the firm determines the relative bargaining power of the bank and the firm, which in turn affects firm behavior. Where particular relationships are desirable (say the bank should be strong in order to encourage costly monitoring, or the firm should be strong in order to encourage firm specific investments by its ma nagers and employers), this paper outlines desirable features of contracts governing the lending relationship.
Appendix 1
Proof of Lemma 1: By Contradiction. Suppose the outside financial market does not infer a bad signal for sure. Then the market must believe that there is a strictly positive probability ν > 0 that there was a good signal. There are two cases:
Case 1: ν < 1. In this case, the outside financial market makes strictly positive profits on loans to firms that have received a good signal (because the market bases its terms of credit on ν < 1). Hence, for firms that received a good signal, the firm and inside bank are better off bargaining over funds and not leaving rents to the market. Hence, firms that have received a good signal do not approach the outside market and ν > 0 is not an equilibrium.
Case 2: ν = 1. In this case, the outside financial market will provide funds at an expected loss to firms that have received a bad signal. Hence all such firms will approach the market for funds and ν = 1 is not an equilibrium.
It remains to be shown that ν = 0 is indeed an equilibrium. In this case, the competitive outside financial market sets terms of credit that would lead to break even for firms that received bad signals and would earn strictly positive rents for firms that have received good signals. Hence, good signal firms will bargain over funds with their inside banks rather than approaching the outside market. On the other hand, firms which received a bad signal are indifferent between approaching the outside market and negotiating with their banks. Hence, ν = 0 is an equilibrium.
QED

Proof of Proposition 1:
We begin by solving the second period bargaining problem between the firm and the inside bank. The bargaining set-up ensures that the bank receives α of any available surplus. Given lemma 1 there is no asymmetric information between the market and the firm/bank coalition if there was a bad signal.
Thus, the firm can raise funds at a fair rate from the competitive financial market and does not have to share any rents with the inside bank. Hence, bargaining only occurs when there was a good signal. We will work out the case for the high quality project (the low quality project case is analogous).
By refusing to bargain, the bank can ensure an outside option equal to the face value of its debt, d D :
,
By refusing to bargain, the firm can approach the outside market for I and get an outside option of 
If, however, the inside bank and the firm cooperate, they can ensure the following together:
Using (19), and noting that the good signal is observed with probability θ and the bank obtains a share α in bargaining, we can see that the total expected bargaining rents earned by the bank are ( ) 
Given this expected bargaining outcome at date 1, the inside bank's date 0 break-even condition is ( ) To determine e D , the manager maximizes firm value net of effort cost V(e), given by: 
Proof of Proposition 2:
The proof of the first part proceeds along exactly the same lines as that of proposition 1. We list only equations that are different: (17), (18), (19), (21), (22), (23), (24), (25) 
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is decreasing in γ at γ = 0. The term in the curly brackets of equation (35) is obviously decreasing in γ.
The first term is also decreasing, because the difference of the term when γ = 0 and when γ > 0 is: The inequality follows from the restrictions in A5, which limit γ to be small (less than α). Thus, the equilibrium level of e is higher for γ > 0, which in turn increases firm value.
QED
Proof of Corollary 2:
It is immediate from equation (9) in proposition 1 that the first best outcome can be attained with debtonly if either α = 0, θ = 0, or (I + i) = 0. Equally, it is immediate from equation (14) in proposition 2 that bank equity γ > 0 can not lead to the first best outcome in those cases.
QED.
24 Technically, the difference in equation (36) is not quite accurate, because it evaluates the two terms at the same level of e. In fact, however, the equilibrium level of e will be different for the case of γ = 0 and the case of γ > 0. However, it is easy to show that the difference Ω is still positive if we explicitly substitute the different equilibrium levels of e. Details are available from the author on request.
Proof of Proposition 3:
The proof of the first part of the proposition proceeds along exactly the same lines as the proof t o proposition 1. We only list the equations that are different: (17), (18) 
OQCXdD γΠΠ (23), (24) and (25) The inequality again follows from the restrictions in A5 that keep γ small. Thus, the equilibrium level of e is higher (closer to FB) in the case of bank equity participation, which in turn increases firm value.
For part 3), we need to derive the equilibrium effort level e OI in case of bank and outside equity participation. The derivation is equivalent to the proof of proposition 1 -and hence omitted. Defining the bank's equity stake as γ IB and the outside equity stake as γ O , the resulting effort level is given by ( To prove the proposition, we need to show that an increase in γ IB -while holding (γ IB + γ O ) constantwould increase managerial effort. All terms in equation (49) QED.
Proof of Proposition 4:
The proof proceeds along the same lines as the previous cases. It is omitted. Details are available from the author on request. The manager's equilibrium effort level is given by ( ) 
The inequality follows from a restriction on ω that ensures that the date 1 risk free debt capacity remains smaller than the funds needed I . This ensures that the hold-up problem remains intact and the problem remains non-degenerate. This is equivalent to assumption A5 (ii) in the equity case and amounts here to assuming that (i + I -C) -(C -I)P h (1/ω -1) > 0.
The numerical example that proves the existence portion of the proposition (part 2)) is based on These parameters imply: 
